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FROM BUCHANAN TO BUTToN: LEGAL ETHICS AND THE
NAACP (PART D)
SUSAN D. CARLEt
INTRODUCTION
This paper continues an inquiry I have undertaken into the relationship be-
tween the NAACP's public impact litigation strategies and traditional legal ethics
norms. In an earlier paper,1 I investigated the legal ethics mindset of the mem-
bers of the NAACP's first national legal committee, who oversaw the organiza-
tion's legal work in the period between 1910 and 1920. These lawyers were elite
New York City practitioners active in bar associations that were enforcing tradi-
tional legal ethics rules against errant practitioners. I showed that these lawyers
championed "test case" 2 litigation strategies that were at odds with traditional
legal ethics rules prohibiting client solicitation, advertising, and barratry or "stir-
ring up" litigation. I concluded that these lawyers were not troubled by the ten-
t Associate Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law. Responsibility for the
accuracy of citations to manuscript sources is mine alone. Many people have given me invaluable help during
the course of this project I would like to thank in particular those colleagues at American University Washing-
ton College of Law who generously took time from their own work to help me with mine: Adrienne Davis,
Robert Dinerstein, Binny Miller, Teemu Ruskola, Michael Tigar, and Let Volpp. I also owe special thanks to a
number of individuals outside my home institution who provided written comments on earlier drafts: Richard
Abel, Dan Ernst, Richard Harm, John Harrison, Clyde Spilienger, Lauren Taylor, and Mark Tushnet. Sue
Jean Kim provided outstanding research assistance. This research was generously funded by American Univer-
sity Washington College of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and the WML Keck Foundation.
1. Susan D. Carle, Race, Clas, and Legal Ethics in the Ear# NVAACP (1910-1920), forthcoming in 20
L & Hist Rev 1 (Spring 2002), text available in pre-print form at
http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/lhr.html (scroll to "Forthcoming"). A longer manuscript incorpo-
rating both of these articles won the Association of American Law Schools' Best Scholarly Paper Award
for 2001.
2. The term "test case" is used to refer to a strategy in which an organization seeks to find or, if
necessary, to create a legal controversy to establish a point of law as precedent in future cases. See Black's
law Dictionagy 207 (7th ed 1999).
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sion between the NAACP's innovative legal work and traditional legal ethics
strictures because they shared an informal understanding that their public inter-
est work should not be subject to the strictures being applied against lawyers
acting with pecuniary motives, and also possessed the professional power to
interpret the rules in this way without fear of censure.
This first article confined its examination to the NAACP's first decade of
existence, between 1910 and 1920. The NAACP's influence on the development
of the ethical norms that apply to public interest law practice by no means ends
with this early period. As most vividly portrayed by Mark Tushnet,3 the
NAACP's legal wars with hostile southern states in the 1950s and 1960s culmi-
nated in the United States Supreme Court's important legal ethics decision
NAACP v Button.4 That case, as described further below, essentially legalized the
public impact litigation techniques that are at the core of United States concep-
tions of how to use law as an instrument for social change.
This article picks up where my earlier article left off and explores the transi-
tion from the early twentieth-century legal ethics views of the NAACP's first
national legal committee to the understanding of the relationship between legal
ethics rules and public interest law reflected in Button. That transition reflects
one aspect of an enormously complicated story that has preoccupied legal histo-
rians for many years-namely, accounting for the fundamental transformations
in American jurisprudence and legal practice that occurred during the first sev-
eral decades of the twentieth century. That story includes the shift from lawyers
and judges' adherence to the apiori, individualistic approach of late nineteenth-
century jurisprudence to the consequentialism and group orientation of socio-
logical jurisprudence and legal realism, changing approaches to procedural and
jurisdictional bars to class actions and other nontraditional forms of litigation,
and the replacement of notions of a consensual "public interest" with ideas of
interest group pluralism. Another chapter of that story, which has received too
little attention thus far, involves transformations in lawyers' conceptions of their
ethical obligations. That is the topic I am interested in here. I thus focus on law-
yers' self-conceptions, rather than on legal doctrine per se. In so doing, I am not
intending to suggest that the doctrinal context was not important; instead I am
aiming for whatever insights might be revealed by reversing the traditional privi-
leging of case law and the actions of courts over the views and actions of the
lawyers who are the living embodiment of legal ethics norms.
I undertake my inquiry by setting up two contrasts. In Part I, I compare
snapshot views of two United States Supreme Court cases that the NAACP
litigated half a century apart, Buchanan v Warley and NAACP v Button.6 In Part
3. See Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rigbts Law: Thugood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961
272-300 (Oxford 1994) ("CivilRigbtsLaw").
4. 371 US 415 (1963).
5. 245 US 60 (1917).
6. 371 US 415 (1963).
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II, I contrast the biographies of two leading NAACP lawyers of different gen-
erations, Moorfield Storey and Charles Hamilton Houston. I examine the so-
dally and historically situated perspectives of these two lawyers and analyze the
complex interactions among a number of variables-including race, social
standing, insider versus outsider status in the profession, political conditions,
and changing jurisprudential conceptions of the nature of legal representation-
that help account for their different approaches to the NAACP's legal ethics
challenges during their respective generations. Finally, in Part Ill, I trace the
development of the Supreme Court's legal ethics jurisprudence under Button and
suggest the beginnings of a critique based on my historical analysis.
I. Two CASES
Buchanan v Warle 7 exemplifies the NAACP's early legal work. As I discuss in
greater detail in my earlier article, much of that work focused on finding-or
often creating-test cases to challenge the constitutionality of racially discrimi-
natory practices.8 In Buchanan, the national office of the NAACP used such a
test case strategy to challenge the constitutionality of a 1914 Louisville, Ken-
tucky, residential segregation ordinance. To create the right circumstances for
this test case, a national staff lawyer organized a new NAACP chapter in Louis-
ville and spoke at public meetings to raise money and recruit a plaintiff. NAACP
lawyers drafted test language for a real estate contract and enlisted a local real
estate agent who wished to contest the law to serve as the defendant When the
case reached the United States Supreme Court, the city argued that the case
should be dismissed because its facts had been manufactured. That charge not
only could have presented a bar to deciding the case on justiciability grounds, 0
but also could have implied ethical misconduct, since "stirring up" litigation that
otherwise would not have existed was a serious ethics offense, otherwise known
as Cbarratry."ll
Nevertheless, patrician lawyer and NAACP President Moorfield Storey,
7. 245 US 60 (1917).
8. See Cade, 20 L & Hist Rev I (cited in note 1).
9. See id.
10. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Pdnaipe and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era.
Part 1: The Hgoday of Jim Crow, 82 Colum L Rev 444, 514 n 265 (1982) (citing cases in which the Court
required "honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights" but also noting "rather haphazard quality" of
the Court's rulings on this issue).
11. See ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 28 (1908), reprinted in Opinion of the Committee
on Professional Ethics and Grievances with the Canons of Prfessional Ethics Annotated and the Canons ofJudicalEthics
Annotated (ABA 1957) ("Stirring Up Litigation It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so."). See also
Black's Law Dictonag at 144 (cited in note 2) ("barratry" defined as "[v]exatious incitement to litigation,
esp. by soliciting potential legal clients"). Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Cal L Rev 48 (1935) (discussing
early twentieth-century conceptions of related offenses of maintenance and champerty).
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whom I will discuss in more detail below, simply gave short shrift to the city's
charges in arguing the case for the NAACP. In an unpublished draft dissent,
Justice Holmes initially agreed with the city, writing, "I cannot but feel a doubt
whether the suit should be entertained without some evidence that it is not a
manufactured case."'12 The Court's unanimous published opinion, however,
ruled in the NAACP's favor without any mention of the manner in which the
underlying controversy had come into existence.' 3
In contrast to the Court's seeming lack of concern about the lawyers' activi-
ties that created the case in Buchanan stands the Court's difficulty, half a century
later, in deciding the legal ethics issues presented in NAACP v Button.14 Button, as
I discuss in greater detail below, arose in 1956 after Virginia enacted new crimi-
nal legislation aimed at barring the NAACP from soliciting clients. The case
reached the Court on the NAACP's appeal from the decision of Virginia's high-
est court, which upheld the statute's constitutionality and concluded that the
NAACP's litigation activities violated various legal ethics laws.' 5 As Mark
Tushnet's detective work in the United States Supreme Court's archives has
revealed, on first hearing, a majority of the Court voted that the NAACP was
subject to criminal ethics sanctions for some of its litigation techniques.' 6 This
would have been the final ruling in the case but for a fortuitous interim change
in the Court's membership that summer which required the case to be reargued.
In the end, a close majority of the Court decided, over a strong dissent by Jus-
tice Harlan, that the First Amendment protects lawyers working for social
change without pecuniary motive from legal ethics constraints against barratry,
solicitation, and related offenses.
This juxtaposition of Buchanan and Button raises puzzling questions: Why,
given the Court's seeming indifference to charges of "manufacturing" a case in
Buchanan in the 1910s, did it have a so much greater difficulty with the NAACP's
litigation practices in Button almost half a century later? Why was NAACP Presi-
dent Moorfield Storey, who was active in many of the very bar organizations
that were making and enforcing traditional legal ethics rules, so nonchalant
about the potential legal ethics violations involved in staging fictitious contro-
versies, recruiting parties, and advertising legal services in Buchanan? And why, if
these legal ethics matters were of such seeming unconcern to lawyers such as
Storey who were involved in the NAACP in the 1910s, were its later lawyer-
leaders Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall so concerned about
potential legal ethics attacks, as Mark Tushnet has described, 7 when they took
over the organization's direction in the mid-1930s?
12. Schmidt, 82 Colum L Rev at 512 (cited in note 10).
13. Buchanan, 245 US at 60.
14. 371 US 415 (1963).
15. NAACP v Harrison, 202 Va 142, 116 SE2d 55 (1960).
16. See Tushnet, Civil Rights Law at 277-80 (cited in note 3).
17. See id at 272-300.
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The answers to these questions, I argue below, can be located in part in the
different socially and historically situated positions of two generations of
NAACP lawyers.
II. Two LAWYERS
Here I contrast the professional biographies of two lawyers who served as
key national advocates for the NAACP during their respective generations as a
means of exploring the transition from Buchanan to Button. In so doing, I hope to
highlight some of the overlooked but important factors that drive change in
legal ethics norms over time-to focus, in other words, not only on changes in
case law and formally codified rules, but also on how differences in lawyers' life
experiences, social and political contexts, professional statuses, and jurispruden-
tial commitments all affect the way that legal ethics law gets made and trans-
formed across generations.
A. MOORFIELD STOREY
Moorfield Storey, as already noted, was the NAACP's Supreme Court advo-
cate in Buchanan v Warky.18 Examining Storey's professional biography helps to
explain his approach to that case and the Supreme Court's reaction to him. In-
deed, his biography epitomizes the elite social and professional standing of the
white lawyers involved in the NAACP's national legal operations in the first
decade of its existence.19
Born in 1845 to one of the oldest Puritan families in New England, Moor-
field Storey was a Boston "blue blood" of impeccable social standing. Storey's
grandfather had made money in trade with South America, but he later lost it.
The family was thus of the social elite but not rich. Storey's father, a Harvard
Law School educated lawyer, was not particularly ambitious or successful in his
legal career, but had an engaging personality and was well connected socially.20
Storey's father had also been active in the abolitionist cause, and the values and
acquaintances Storey acquired through his childhood association with this
movement stayed with him, eventually propelling him into the presidency of the
NAACP.
1. Education and Practice Experience
Like his father and grandfather before him, Storey attended Harvard Col-
18. 245 US 60 (1917).
19. For a description of the lawyers involved in the NAACP's first national legal committee, see
Carle, 20 L & Hist Rev 1 (cited in note 1).
20. William B. Hixson, MoorrieldStorej and the Aboliionist Tradiion 3-16 (Oxford 1972) ("MoodiddSto-
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lege. He graduated in 1866 and enrolled in Harvard Law School that same year,
a few years prior to Christopher Langdell's introduction of his new rigorous case
method of study at the school. According to Storey, the law school functioned
as little more than a social club for young men who could afford to spend addi-
tional years in school. There he drifted pleasantly through his classes, where
"[s]tudy ... was optional" and his routine consisted of "Boston parties ... from
half-past nine [at night] to about three," with the remainder of his time "largely
devoted to sleep. '21
Bored with what law school had to offer, Storey left during his second year
of study to assume a position, arranged by his father, as private secretary to the
abolitionist senator Charles Sumner.22 In 1869, Storey, recently engaged to be
married, left his clerkship with Sumner to return to Boston where he obtained a
job, once again through his father's connections, "looking up law" for the law
firm of Brooks and Ball, one of Boston's "busiest" commercial law firms.23 Sto-
rey soon left that job to take a position, this time arranged for him by Sumner,
as an assistant district attorney. In 1873, Storey returned to Brooks and Ball as a
partner and practiced business law there until 1887, when he formed his own
law firm, Storey, Thorndike and Hoar. Storey's clients included the Union Pa-
cific Railroad Company and other railroads, as well as brokerage firms and
mortgage trust companies.24 Storey's firm also prospered in serving as inde-
pendent bond counsel, "act[ing] for all sorts of bond-buyers all over the coun-
try," an area of law practice that depended on the impeccability of the reputa-
tions of the lawyers providing opinions on the validity of bond issues.25
Storey described his role in the firm as being "largely in charge of litiga-
tion. '26 Representing clients in the customs, income tax, insurance, bankruptcy,
21. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Portrait of an Independent: Moodfeld Story, 1845-1929 36-37 (Houghton Mif-
flin 1932) ("Portrait of an Independent).
22. Hixson, Moo-field Storey at 11 (cited in note 20).
23. Howe, Portrait of an Independent at 131 (cited in note 21).
24. Id at 183. Another of Storey's clients was the United Fruit Company, a notoriously bad actor in
Latin America that Storey defended from antitrust charges after it engineered the Costa Rican govern-
ment's seizure of a rival company's property in Panama. See American Banana Co v United Fruit Co, 213 US
347 (1909). Storey's representation of this client seems notably incongruous with his activism in support of
the Anti-Imperialist League. In his unpublished autobiography, Storey stated, perhaps somewhat defen-
sively, "We did not undertake to advise [United Fruit] on questions of business, but only questions of law."
Howe, Portrait of an Independent at 185 (cited in note 21). On the history of United Fruit Company's actions
in Central America, see generally Paul J. Dosal, Doing Business with the Dictators: A Political Histogy of United
Fruit in Guatemala: 1899-1944 (Scholarly Resource 1993); Charles D. Kepner, Jr. and Jay J. Soothi, The
Banana Empire: A Case Study of Economic Imperialists (Vanguard 1935).
25. Howe, Portrait of an Independent at 185 (cited in note 21) (quoting from Storey's unpublished
autobiography). On the special position of Boston "gentlemen" lawyers in the field of independent bond
counseling, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise 1870-
1920, in Gerald L. Geison, ed, Professions and Profissional Ideologies in America 79, 131 n 40 (North Carolina
1983).
26. Quoted in Howe, Portrait of an Independent at 186 (cited in note 21).
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and securities areas,27 Storey accumulated an impressive record that won him a
reputation as one of Boston's premier lawyers. Storey's law practice thus allowed
him to provide comfortably for his family despite his lack of inherited wealth.
But Storey was far from single-minded about his pursuit of economic suc-
cess. Like many other elite lawyers of his time, Storey devoted considerable time
to civic matters. Storey sat on the Harvard Board of Overseers28 and, if his ac-
count is true, found himself elected ABA president in 1885 after delivering a
well received speech-even though he "had never attended any of the meetings
or taken [his] membership seriously."29 This professional honor gave him still
higher standing and visibility at the bar.30 Storey attributed his involvement in
the NAACP and other unpopular political causes later in his life to his attain-
ment of this high pinnade of professional success, writing in his unpublished
autobiography, "When I was placed in positions where my views counted, I
developed a predilection for the under-dog."31
Despite his commitment to reform causes, Storey was a deeply traditional
legal thinker. Storey agreed with those who saw "knowledge of the law as a sci-
ence" discerned through study of classical works.32 His writings bear no signs of
having been influenced by the law-as-policy thinking of the early twentieth cen-
tury.33 It was, indeed, the very traditionalism of Storey's legal thinking that moti-
vated his civil rights activism. Storey believed deeply in the principles of due
process and individual rights and, further motivated by the example of his fam-
ily's own activism in the abolitionist movement, gave life to his beliefs through
his own activism.34 That activism covered both domestic and international mat-
ters. Storey was passionately opposed to United States imperialism in the Philip-
pines,35 a cause to which he devoted a great deal of time-perhaps even more
than he gave to the NAACP if his personal scrapbooks are taken as the meas-
27. Id at 164.
28. Id at 165.
29. Quoted in id at 187.
30. Id at 188.
31. Quoted in id at 169.
32. See Moorfield Storey, The Reform ofLegalProcedure 6 (Yale 1911).
33. See Hixson, Moorield Storey at 34 (cited in note 20). In this respect, Storey's world view was at
odds with the unabashed progressivism of some of the other renowned lawyers, including Louis Brandeis,
Karl Llewellyn, and Roscoe Pound, who also played (much more peripheral roles in the early NAACP.
34. Storey sometimes struggled with the tension between his commitment to the cause of African-
American civil rights and his deeply conservative political and jurisprudential perspective. He had great
personal difficulty, for example, in supporting the NAACP's campaign to make lynching a federal crime.
Storey believed such federal legislation would violate the principles of federalism announced by the United
States Supreme Court, which he viewed as pronouncements of unambiguous law. See Susan D. Carle, Re-
envisonng ModeLrfor Pro Bono Lag'eng: Some Historical Reections, 9 Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L 81, 88
(2001).
35. See Hixson, MooeldStory at 45-97 (cited in note 20); Howe, Portrait of an Independent at 196-229
(cited in note 21). On the relationship between the rise of domestic racism and American imperialism
overseas, see C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career ofJimi Crow 72-73 (Oxford 3d ed 1974).
2001]
288 Roundtable
ure.3 6 On the domestic front, Storey had spoken out early in his career against
the wave of violence, segregation, and disenfranchisement against African
Americans that was overcoming the United States, and this outspoken position,
unusual among his peers, quickly earned him a reputation as a defender of Afri-
can-American civil rights. In addition, the Storey family's friendships with Wil-
liam Lloyd Garrison and his grandson, NAACP Board Chair Oswald Garrison
Villard, gave Storey a special personal connection to some of the NAACP's
founders. As a result of these friendships, his public position on the issue of
African-American civil rights, and his prestige as a lawyer and former president
of the ABA, Storey found himself elected president of the NAACP in 1910,
again at a meeting he did not attend. Storey was to hold this position, as well as
serve as a legal advisor and chief Supreme Court advocate for the NAACP, until
his death in 1929 at eighty-four years of age.
Although Storey's correspondence with the NAACP on occasion displays
some crankiness and weariness, Storey's commitment to the NAACP was
wholehearted and sincere. In the organization's early years, Storey contributed
large amounts of money37 and lent his name to the NAACP's "Moorfield Sto-
rey" fundraising drive, which put the organization on reasonably firm financial
footing through the 1920s. Storey frequently used his personal connections to
assist the NAACP's causes, helping, for example, to organize a campaign within
the ABA to oppose the exclusion of three African-American attorneys from
membership, 38 and used his power as a member of the Harvard Board of Over-
seers to halt the introduction of segregation in Harvard's dormitories. 39 On an-
other occasion, Storey wrote to President Wilson and demanded a hearing on
the institution of race segregation in federal employment facilities under that
administration. 40 Storey also played an important role in recruiting other promi-
nent white lawyers to assist in arguing high profile NAACP cases.41
Just as Storey's reputation and stature helped the NAACP in these and
other respects, Storey's service as the NAACP's first chief Supreme Court advo-
36. See Papers of Moorfield Storey, Moorfield Storey Scrapbooks, Box 22 (Library of Congress
Manuscript Div) ("Storey Papers").
37. See, for example, Executive Committee Meeting (Apr 11, 1911), in Papers ofthe NAACP Part 1,
Reel 1 (U Publication 1982, 1996) ("NAACP Papers").
38. On this debacle, see Jerold Auerbach, UnequalJustice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America
65-66 (Oxford 1976); John A. Matzko, The Early Years of /he American Bar Association, 1878-1928 234-46
(1984) (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with the University of Virginia li-
brary). The compromise Storey was involved in negotiating permitted the three African-American lawyers
who had been denied membership to join but instituted a rule prohibiting African Americans from mem-
bership prospectively. No African-American lawyer subsequenly obtained admission to the ABA until the
1940s. See Richard L. Abel, American Laigers 108 (Oxford 1989).
39. Store Papers at Box 4, Antilynching Speeches-Articles folder (cited in note 36).
40. Charles Flint Kellogg, NAACP: A Histoy of the National Assodation for the Advancement of Colored
People, Vol I: 1909-1920 167 Gohns Hopkins 1967).
41. See Robert L. Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynchin 1909-1950 85-88 (Temple
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cate undoubtedly helped it win cases. By 1913, Storey had already represented
the NAACP as amicus curiae in Guinn v United States,42 which invalidated states'
use of "grandfather clauses" to disenfranchise African-American voters and
gave the NAACP an important early victory that helped build its reputation and
membership. Moreover, Storey's stellar reputation produced results that may
have been impossible for a lawyer with a lesser reputation to obtain, as when he
successfully defended the poor tenant farmers whose lives were at stake in Moore
v Dempsy.43
2. Moore v Dempsey
Moore v Dempsg expanded the U.S. Supreme Court's grant of due process
protections to criminal defendants.44 The story underlying Moore bears retelling
in order to highlight the significance of Storey's achievement in winning this
case.45 The case arose when a group of African-American tenant farmers in rural
Phillips County, Arkansas, sought to organize a tenants' organization to obtain
higher prices for their cotton crops. The group held a meeting in a church to
raise money for the organization and to consult with the son of a white lawyer,
U.S. Bratton, about their legal rights. A group of whites stormed the church and
a shootout ensued in which a white man was killed. This confrontation quickly
escalated into a countywide rampage that left more than 200 African Americans
and several whites dead.
In the ensuing weeks, almost ninety African-American citizens of Phillips
County-but no whites-were indicted on charges of murder. NAACP national
staff member Walter White traveled to Phillips County to investigate the situa-
tion personally under the guise of a newspaper reporter. Barely escaping -with his
life after his true identity was discovered, White drafted vivid reports describing
the prevailing mob mentality in the county that obliterated any chance of a fair
trial for the Phillips County defendants. The NAACP began raising money to
help in the defense and eventually began working with a local committee that
had retained as its lawyer Scipio Africanus Jones, an African-American attorney
of high reputation 46 Jones ended up handling the bulk of the defense work,
42. 238 US 347 (1915).
43. 261 US 86 (1923).
44. For a recent assessment of the significance of Moore v Denprsy in this respect, see Michael J.
Klarman, The Radal Origins ofModem Criminal Procedure, 99 ich L Rev 48, 52-61 (2000) ("Raial Orgins).
45. Richard C. Cortner, A Mob Intent on Death: The NAACP and the Arkansas Riot Cases (Wesleyan
1988) (an especially invaluable resource on the Moore case because many of the manuscripts concerning this
case have been lost).
46. Born enslaved, Scipio Jones attended public schools after emancipation and then attended a
private college. He was denied admission to the University of Arkansas' law school on account of race but
gained entry to the Arkansas bar in 1889 after reading law in the offices of white lawyers in Little Rock. See
Mary White Ovington, Portraits in Color 92-93 (Viking 1927) (biographical essay); Tom Dillard, Scipio A
Joneg, 31 Ark Historical Q 201 (1972); Judith Kilpatrick, Race Expectations: Arkansas Afdcan-Amedcan Ator-
ngs (1865-1950), 9 Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L 63, 70-74 (2000). Jones built a successful law practice
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which spanned five years and included several rounds of appeals, retrials, and
habeas proceedings.
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, Jones urged the
NAACP to approach Storey to represent the Phillips County defendants. Storey
responded, "I must be satisfied... that they have a good case," and asked James
Weldon Johnson to find "a good lawyer" to brief the cases for him and "submit
them to me for my judgment," explaining, "I do not want to appear in court in a
case that I cannot maintain." 47 Storey examined the case more closely and
agreed to handle it, and soon after reported that he was growing "more and
more confident that my cause is just. '48
Storey's task of achieving a reversal of the defendants' convictions in Moore v
Dempsy was not an easy one. Several years earlier another prominent Supreme
Court advocate, Louis Marshall (who also later argued Supreme Court cases for
the NAACP), had lost an appeal to the Court in a similar case, Frank v Man-
gum.49 That case arose after Leo Frank, a Jewish factory owner in Fulton County,
Georgia, was accused of murdering a young female employee and convicted in a
trial dominated by an angry mob. Marshall sought habeas corpus review of the
conviction on the ground that the disorder surrounding Frank's trial had de-
prived him of due process of law, but the Court denied Marshall's petition. The
Court held that it must defer to the results of the state courts' appeal procedures
and the lower courts' findings about the fairness of the trial even though the
district court had not held a factual hearing into the matter before reaching its
conclusions on the habeas petition.50
The extremely deferential standard of scrutiny that the Court had an-
nounced it would apply in reviewing cases raising due process violations based
on allegations of mob dominated trials presented a troubling roadblock in secur-
ing the Supreme Court's reversal in Moore v Dempsy. Storey's evidence was based
on the affidavits of the five defendants who had been sentenced to death, each
of whom stated that his confession to charges of murder had been extracted
through whipping and other forms of torture, and two affidavits from white
railroad men of dubious reputation who claimed they had witnessed and partici-
pated in the whipping of the defendants.51 The lower court had considered these
affidavits but nevertheless dismissed the habeas corpus petition without a factual
hearing. Storey's task was to convince the Supreme Court to reverse the lower
combining the representation of African-American fraternal organizations with civil rights cases.
47. Letter from Moorfield Storey to James W. Johnson (Nov 3, 1921), in NAACP Papers at Part 1,
Reel 24, frame 177 (cited in note 37).
48. Letter from Moorfield Storey to Walter White (Nov 15, 1922), in Papers of Arthur Spingam,
Box 7, July-Dec 1922 folder (Library of Congress Manuscript Div).
49. 237 US 309 (1915).
50. See 237 US at 329, 332. The Frank case had a tragic ending Leo Frank was later lynched by a
mob while ostensibly in state custody.
51. See Moore, 261 US at 92-93 (McReynolds dissenting); Cortner, A Mob Intent on Death at 121-25
(cited in note 45).
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court despite the precedent presented by Frank.
After briefing and oral argument, Storey achieved this result. He convinced
a majority of the Court that the case should be remanded to the lower court
with instructions to conduct a full factual inquiry into the allegations raised in
the affidavits submitted in support of the habeas petition.52 In dissent, Justice
McReynolds, joined by Justice Sutherland, forecast "grav[e]" consequences if
"every man convicted of crime in a state court may... by swearing, as advised,
that certain allegations of fact tending to impeach his trial are true... thereby
obtain as of right further review." 53 McReynolds argued that "[u]nder the dis-
dosed circumstances I cannot agree that the solemn adjudications by courts of a
great State . . . can be successfully impeached by the mere exparte affidavits
made upon information and belief of ignorant convicts joined by two white
men-confessedly atrocious criminals." 54 McReynolds was wrong, however, in
asserting that "the mere exparte affidavits" of "ignorant convicts" and "crimi-
nals" had achieved the result in Moore v Dempsgy. An added ingredient in the mix
was the fact that one of the nation's most renowned and well respected Supreme
Court advocates had chosen to represent the defendants. 55
Storey's writings give us a window into his conception of his role in serving
as the NAACP's legal advocate. In his Storrs Lectures delivered at Yale Law
School, Storey presented his vision of lawyers as guardians of the "deep public
interest in which the calling of the lawyer is affected. 56 Storey denounced as
"pernicious" Lord Brougham's doctrine that "makes no distinction between the
client who is guilty and one who is innocent, between justice and injustice, be-
tween right and wrong."57 Storey argued that lawyers should refrain from engag-
ing in procedures to manipulate court processes when the substantive merits of
the case were not on the client's side.58 Moreover, Storey argued that it was the
52. On remand, the NAACP faced significant problems in obtaining the needed testimony from the
two railroad men who had given affidavits. In the intervening years, these witnesses had demanded and
received substantial economic support from the NAACP (on the ground that giving their affidavits had
cost them their livelihoods and their homes), and thus were vulnerable to being discredited on the stand.
Even worse, it is likely that they would have refused to enter the state to give testimony, out of fear for
their lives. For the story of how Jones succeeded in negotiating a compromise that achieved the defen-
dants' release, see Cortmer, A Mob Intent on Death at 166-84 (cited in note 45).
53. Moore, 261 US at 93 n 1 (internal quotations omitted).
54. Id at 102.
55. For a discussion of the remarkableness of the Supreme Court's reversal of position in Moore, see
generally Klarman, Radal Ogins at 59-61, 77 (cited in note 44). Klarman notes that this reversal occurred
only eight years after Frank and that changes in the Court's membership in the meantime "[i]f anything...
appeared disadvantageous to litigants seeking the Court's intervention against mob-dominated trials." Id at
59.
56. Storey, The Refon of LegalProcedutr at 6 (cited in note 32).
57. Id at 30. Whether Storey practiced what he preached is a different matter. See Carle, 9 Am U J
Gender Soc Pol & L at 84 n 14, 93 (cited in note 34) (noting inconsistency between Storey's opposition to
imperialism as a matter of public policy and his representation of the United Fruit Company). See also note
24.
58. Storey condemned practices such as refusing to admit a debt owed in order to buy more time to
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lawyer's duty (not the possibly "angry or unscrupulous" client's) to "decid[e]
whether or not to carry a case further"-a duty the lawyer must carry out as "an
officer of the Court, whose duty it is to help in securing justice," rather than as
an agent of his client, whose purpose might be "to delay or defeat [justice]."s9
These sentiments echoed views expressed by turn-of-the-century lawyers
who adhered to the "lawyers as gatekeepers of justice" view of lawyers' proper
role vis-a-vis their clients.60 But Storey took his ideas a step farther when he
argued that lawyers should use their personal reputations to vouch for the
"rightness" of their clients' causes. Storey asserted:
When it is known that [a lawyer's] presence in Court means that he thinks his cli-
ent right, that mere presence has great weight with jury or with Court. The services
of such a man are sought by all, and the client is fortunate who secures them....
To such men, only, come the highest rewards of our profession.
61
This strong daim-that the mere presence in court of a lawyer of high reputa-
tion could provide a warranty of the justice of a client's cause-was unusual
even among those who argued for lawyers' duty to police the justice of their
clients' causes; far more common at the time were acknowledgments that law-
yers' ethical duties stopped short of lending their personal morality to the clients
they represented. But Storey's statement captured the essence of his approach to
lawyering for the NAACP. As we have seen, Storey lent his reputation to the
organization when he judged a case to be right and just.62 In so doing, he
boosted his client's credibility at a time when its organizational resources were
otherwise slim.
Storey's conception of his role as a lawyer helps explain his lack of concern
about the charges by attorneys for the city of Louisville that the NAACP had
"manufactured" the facts underlying Buchanan v Warley. For Storey, as for the
other lawyers of similar professional stature who were directing the NAACP's
national legal operations in its earliest years,63 the notion that laudable public
service work could give rise to serious ethics concerns was simply a non-issue.
pay it back, raising meritless defenses, and forcing the other side in a lawsuit to "pay for everything you
get." Storey, The Reform of Legal Procedure at 33 (cited in note 32).
59. Id at 157. This conception thus reverses the emphasis we would place today on the relative im-
portance of the lawyer's duties to the court and client in deciding whether a lawsuit should be filed. Com-
pare with Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1999) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation... and shall consult with the client as to the means
by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of
settlement.").
60. For further discussion of this concept, see Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duy to Do Justice: A New
Look at the Histor
, 
ofthe 1908 Canons, 24 L & Soc Inquiry 1, 10-13, 18-22 (1999).
61. Id at 40.
62. This was true in his pro bono work, though apparently not a standard he applied to paying cli-
ents. See note 24.
63. For more on these lawyers, see Carle, 20 L & Hist Rev at 1 (cited in note 1).
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Storey was implicitly confident that his willingness to lend his enormous stature
to the NAACP would signal to the Court that he believed in the "justice" of his
client's cause-as in Moore-and that he could thus count on the Justices taking
his case seriously.
Storey's jurisprudential outlook, which saw the development of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence as a gradual unfolding of inherently correct principles of
law, fturther supported his confidence that the Court would see the case in the
same light as he did. In other words, the Court and Storey shared a world view
that permitted the smoothing over of potential legal ethics problems with the
understanding that the underlying merits of the case were just.64
In contrast, the Supreme Court's concerns in later decades about how the
NAACP carried out its innovative and far reaching public impact litigation strat-
egy would be far more acute. As a window into the complex interplay of factors
that explain this changed response, I contrast Storey's professional biography
with that of a later NAACP leader, Charles Hamilton Houston.
B. CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON
If Storey exemplified the professional and social privilege of the elite white
lawyers who led the NAACP's legal operations in its first decade of existence,
African-American lawyer Charles Hamilton Houston exemplified the new kind
of civil rights lawyer who took charge of the NAACP in the mid-1 930s. Even by
the 1920s, as August Meier and Elliott Rudwick have documented, a shift had
begun in the racial balance of the NAACP's staff and legal committee.65 In the
early 1930s, the Harvard-educated Charles Hamilton Houston began to impress
64. One commentator on an earlier draft of this paper helpfully pointed out that the jurisprudence
of the United States Supreme Court at the time generally displayed little concern about the evils of "collu-
sive" litigation. But see Schmidt, 82 Colum L Rev at 514 n 265 (cited in note 10) (citing cases in which the
court upheld the "honest and actual" controversy requirement). This commentator cited Pollock v Farmers'
Loan andTrust Co, 157 US 429, on rehearing, 158 US 601 (1895), as one example of litigation in which, as in
Buchanan, the parties were not truly adverse. The case challenged the constitutionality of the corporate
income tax, in which the defendant no more wanted the conclusion that the tax was valid than Warley
hoped his contract could be upheld. In Pollock, however, the lawyers did not "create" the facts to the same
extent that the NAACP's lawyers did in Buchana, the defendant in Poiock independently owed the tax at
issue, whereas there would have been no legal obligation to test in Buchanan had the NAACP's lawyers not
drafted a test contract. Thus Buchanan arguably raised a more serious question regarding the ethics of "cre-
ating" litigation that would not have existed otherwise than did test case litigation of the Pollock variety.
Part of the problem in all of these cases was the unavailability of a declaratory judgment as a form of
relief prior to passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934. See generally Donald L. Doemberg and
Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded
FederalJuridiion Whik the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L Rev 529, 547-61 (1989) (describing the
Supreme Court's rigid application of case or controversy requirements prior to the Declaratory Judgment
Act's passage).
65. See August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, Attorneys Black and White: A Case Studfy of Rae Relations
Within the NAACP, in August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, Along the Color Line: Explorations in the Black
Experience 128-73 (Illinois 1976); August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, The Rise of the Black Secretariat in the
NAACP, 1909-1935, in Meier and Rudwick, Along the ColorLine at 94-127.
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the NAACP with his command of the courtroom. 66 In 1934, Houston joined
the NAACP national staff as special counsel. From that point on, the lawyers
affiliated with the legal committee became much less involved in the organiza-
tion's legal affairs and control of the organization's legal work vested in Hous-
ton, and later in Houston's protg6, Thurgood Marshall.67
This shift in the organization's legal leadership signaled important changes
at many levels, as illustrated by the contrast between the biographies of Houston
and Storey. In some respects the two men appear similar: both held elite educa-
tional credentials and both became known as the NAACP's foremost legal ad-
vocates during their respective generations. In many other respects, however,
their lives stand in sharpest contrast. Both attended Harvard Law School but
their experiences there were very different, a result not only of differences in
class and race but also of the changing pedagogy and jurisprudence of the inter-
vening fifty years. Houston's assumption of the role of chief public advocate for
the NAACP in the 1930s thus marked a key transition in the organization's legal
program-not only from one led predominantly by whites to one led predomi-
nantly by African Americans, 68 but also from an approach to law based on a
confidence in natural law principles, as in Storey's world view, to an approach
based on the social policy focus of sociological jurisprudence and early legal
realism.
Houston's life story is insightfully examined by his biographer, Genna Rae
McNeil.69 Born in 1895, Houston was raised in Washington, D.C., in a middle
class African-American family. His father held a law degree from Howard Uni-
versity and struggled to make a living practicing law, working part-time as a gov-
ernment clerk for most of Houston's childhood to make ends meet. In the eve-
ning, Houston's father taught at Howard University's law school. Houston's
mother had been a teacher and worked as a hairdresser to help earn the money
that would allow Houston to attend college and law school.70 Supported eco-
nomically by his parents, Houston graduated magna cum laude from Amherst
College in 1915. He served in the United States army as an officer during World
War I, where his personal experiences with racial prejudice led him to decide on
law as a career.7' In 1919, Houston was admitted to Harvard Law School, which
at that time accepted a few "superior" black students in each class. Using Veter-
ans Bureau education benefits supplemented by money sent from home, Hous-
ton attended Harvard Law School from 1919 to 1922, obtaining an LL.B. and
66. Meier and Rudwick, Attornys Black and White at 149-51 (cited in note 65).
67. See Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-1950 31-32
(North Carolina 1987) ("NAACPs LegalStratey").
68. See Meier and Rudwick, Rise of the Black Secretariat (cited in note 65).
69. Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Citil Rights (Pennsyl-
vania 1983) ("Groundwork").
70. Id at 15-34.
71. Id at 36-45.
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then an LL.M. in jurisprudence.
In short, the seeming similarity in Houston's and Storey's educational back-
grounds masks deep differences. Storey, as we have seen, drifted pleasantly
through his two years of study at Harvard Law School, engaged primarily in
socializing at Boston high society parties and clubs.7 2 Houston, in contrast, was
excluded on racial grounds from the fraternities and dubs that provided the
focus of law school social life. Storey spent almost no time on his classwork;
Houston, who carried the extra burden of having to disprove assumptions that
his race would make him an inferior student, devoted almost all of his time to
study.7 3 Storey absorbed traditional jurisprudence with an emphasis on individ-
ual rights; Houston studied sociological jurisprudence with Roscoe Pound.
1. Sociological Jurisprudence
Houston's law school notes reveal the intensity of his study of the history
and theories of jurisprudence with Pound. Houston's notebooks, preserved for
scholars' examination at Howard University's Moorland-Spingam Research Cen-
ter, contain hundreds upon hundreds of pages of comprehensive notes, color-
coded outlines, and abstracts of assigned articles and independent reading that
would put any contemporary law student to shame.74 His notes capture Pound
expounding that while nineteenth-century schools of jurisprudence "are con-
cerned with the content of the law; sociological [urisprudence] considers the
working of the law rather than its content." Similarly, Houston records Pound
describing law "as a social institution capable of improvement by conscious
human effort as well as natural growth," so that the "D]urist's duty is to discover
the best means of conscious improvement" 75 Sociological jurisprudence, Hous-
ton learned, involved a concern "not with what law is but with what it does" and
"hwith the legal order we are trying to achieve through law.' 76
Upon his graduation from Harvard Law School in 1923, Houston settled in
Washington, D.C., going into practice with his father and teaching part-time, as
his father had, at Howard University Law School. In 1929, Houston became
Vice Dean at Howard and began the efforts that would transform that law
school from an unaccredited night school to a fully accredited institution dedi-
72. Howe, Portrait of an Independent at 36 (cited in note 21).
73. McNeil, Groundwork at 46-52 (cited in note 69).
74. Charles Hamilton Houston Papers, Box 163-5, folders 1, 3-5, 8-10, 16, 18 (Moorfield-Spingam
Research Center, Howard University) ("Houston Paper?').
75. Id at folder 8 (lecture notes for October 26,1922).
76. Id at folder 3. Other samples of Houston's lecture notes from Pound's classes contain lengthy
analyses of the history of jurisprudence, with comparisons to the developing jurisprudence of the twentieth
century, such as, while "19th century schools look for something behind the rule; sociological [jurispru-
dence gives] effect to social engineering- the stress is on the end we are aiming at," and standards are
"shifting from equality of action to equality in the satisfaction of wants." Id at folder 8 (lecture notes for
October 26, 1922).
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cated to training new generations of African-American lawyers. Houston took
the ideas he gained through his elite law school training, including his immersion
in the new sociological jurisprudence that took improved social policy as the
goal and law as the means or instrument to attain that goal, and applied them to
create a vision of African-American lawyers as "social engineers."7 By passing
on these ideas in training and mentoring a new generation of mostly African-
American civil rights lawyers, Houston ensured that his vision would have a
deep and lasting impact on how we think today about public interest law.
Not only his education but also his practice experience contributed to
Houston understanding the NAACP's legal challenges in a very different way
than Storey had. Storey, a legal insider, had little to fear from the legal ethics
establishment, but Houston's early formative practice experiences gave him a
different perspective. Houston learned early in his career that merely believing in
the justness of one's cause was not sufficient to dismiss the possibility of legal
ethics attacks.
2. Practice Experience
One of Houston's most significant formative experiences took place in a
case that vividly demonstrated the potential consequences of being accused of
legal ethics breaches as a lawyer for an unpopular cause. The case involved dis-
ciplinary proceedings that the state of Maryland instituted against Bernard Ades,
a white lawyer for the Industrial Labor Defense (ILD), an organization with
Communist party sympathies that sought to combat racial and other forms of
injustice in the courts by providing legal representation to defendants wrongly
charged with crimes.7 8 Ades had allegedly pressed offers of legal services on
several unwilling defendants, including Euel Lee, an African-American man who
had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Another allegation was
that Ades had convinced this client to bequeath his body to him and that Ades
intended to give his client's body to the ILD to exhibit in a protest demonstra-
tion. The legal charges against Ades included improperly injecting himself into
Lee's case for the purpose of asserting the views of the ILD rather than the
interests of his client, stirring up litigation, solicitation of business, barratry, in-
citement of racial prejudice, and making false statements about court officials to
the media.7 9
The state of Maryland sought Ades' disbarment on these charges, but Hous-
ton, with assistance from Thurgood Marshall, then newly graduated from How-
ard Law School, successfully defended Ades from the charges that he had
77. McNeil, Groundwork at 84 (cited in note 69). This is the term used by McNeil, though she does
not examine in depth its connection to the sociological jurisprudence Houston absorbed in law school.
78. For an account of the difficult relations between the ILD and the NAACP in the 1920s, see
Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South 51-103 (Louisiana State 1969).
79. See Complaint, In re Ades, in Houston Papers at Box 163-36, folder 15 (cited in note 74).
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unlawfully solicited business and stirred up racial prejudice. Ades received only a
reprimand for his conduct in connection with the disposal of his client's body
and criticisms of the courts.80 Houston later stated that he thought Ades was the
best case he ever prepared.81
Although he could not have known it at the time, the precedent Houston
set in Ades would become important when the NAACP clashed with legal ethics
authorities in hostile southern states in the 1950s and 1960s. It was also impor-
tant in demonstrating to Houston the NAACP's vulnerability to legal ethics
charges in hostile jurisdictions. Indeed, Houston's correspondence reflects his
concern with this issue from the time he took over the NAACP's legal opera-
tions.
Houston's concerns about the NAACP's vulnerability to legal ethics charges
are reflected, for example, in 1937 correspondence between Houston and the
chair of the Mobile, Alabama, branch of the NAACP. The branch had asked
that the national office contact local school principals to urge "their cooperation
in securing memberships and funds for promoting [a] proposed teachers' salary
case here."82 Houston declined this request, explaining that it "is impossible for
the National Office to do this because that would open us up to the charge of
fomenting litigation." Houston further cautioned that "you, yourself, must be
careful to see that whatever you do, you do not put down too much in writing";
it "is one thing to talk to the principals and an entirely different thing to write
them." Houston suggested that the branch send the principals a copy of an arti-
cle on teacher salary equalization from The Crisis, which would "give them the
ways and means of going about the matter of protecting their rights but it will
not be any solicitation to them." Houston ended by reiterating that his reaction
did not reflect a "disposition to shirk on our part' but only concern that "we
have got to watch out for every possibility of twisting the issues around so that
we get ourselves in a jam."83 Forwarding this reply to Thurgood Marshall, Hous-
ton attached a memo warning "[t]hese letters would be all that would be needed
for an Alabama court to hold you in contempt or to cause you to be indicted for
champerty." 84
80. See In reAdes, 6 F Supp 467, 482 (1934).
81. Letter from Charles H. Houston to Walter White (an 2,1940), in Houston Papers at Box 163-25,
Walter White 1940 folder (cited in note 74).
82. Letter from Charles H. Houston toJ.L LeFlore, Mobile, Alabama (Oct 14, 1937), in Papers of
the NAACP Records, Group I, Box 5-G, Mobile, Ala, Oct-Dec 1937 folder (Library of Congress Manu-
script Div).
83. Id.
84. Id. See also Tushnet, NAACPs Legal Strategy at 105 (cited in note 67) (describing Houston's
concern that involvement in particular cases might lead to charges of "trumped up" litigation); Tushnet,
CisilPgks Law at 117 n 4 (cited in note 3) (quoting correspondence between Marshall and Walter White in
1940 and 1941, in which Marshall advised White that asking a teachers' association for "contributions to
the NAACP on condition that we file [a] case for them" was "clearly within the statutes forbidding the
solicitation of legal business," and warned, "All of the states in the South are convinced that they cannot
defeat these cases in court and are looking for any means at all to stop them.").
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In short, Houston came to his work at the NAACP with a cautious aware-
ness of the way that legal ethics rules could be used to damage vulnerable, un-
popular organizations. That caution was based on his personal, educational, and
professional experiences, which gave him a very different understanding of the
nature of law and of lawyering in the public interest than Storey held. Storey saw
law as a manifestation of a natural justice; Houston saw law as inherently politi-
cal and manipulable for social policy aims-good or bad. Storey approached his
advocacy for the NAACP with the unconscious self-assurance of a member of
the bar's patrician elite; Houston, while gaining much from his elite educational
credentials, had a strong awareness of his racial status as an outsider, both pro-
fessionally and as a political citizen.
These many contrasts in turn reflect, in complicated ways, the changing sen-
sibilities of the legal profession and the country as a whole during the first half
of the twentieth century. The contrasts between the professional life experiences
of these two important NAACP leaders help illuminate the complex phenomena
that account for the Buchanan to Button transition.
iL LEGAL ETHICS AND THE LATER NAACP
The story of the NAACP's legal ethics troubles reaches its denouement in
the legal ethics attacks the organization endured in the South in the 1950s and
1960s. Houston did not remain head of the NAACP's legal operations long
enough to lead it through these attacks; in 1938, he left his full-time position
with the NAACP to return to practice with his father in Washington, D.C.,
where he pursued advocacy on economic justice issues.85 However, as McNeil
persuasively demonstrates, Houston's leadership laid the "groundwork" for the
organization's future. Consistent with his emphasis on educating new genera-
tions of lawyers, Houston had trained a cadre of young African-American attor-
neys to continue the work of social engineering through law that he envisioned
for the NAACP. One of those lawyers was Thurgood Marshall, whom Houston
groomed to be his successor as NAACP legal director. Marshall brought to this
position the same caution about the organization's vulnerability to legal ethics
charges that Houston had displayed. 86
In his compelling account of the NAACP's litigation against segregated
schools, Tushnet documents the many ways in which Marshall sought to guard
the NAACP from attacks on the legal ethics front. As former Legal Committee
chair Arthur Spingarn had many years before,87 Marshall strove mightily to
85. Houston's litigation of civil rights issues against labor unions on behalf of African-American
employees made foundational law on labor unions' duties of fair representation to members. See, for
example, Steele v Louistille & Nashville RR Co, 323 US 192 (1944).
86. Tushnet, Civil Rigbts Law at 274 (cited in note 3).
87. See Carle, 20 L & Hist Rev at 1 (cited in note 1).
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monitor the activities of local lawyers affiliated with the NAACP.8S As Spingarn
had, he sometimes succeeded and sometimes failed at this task. Tushnet de-
scribes, for example, how the national NAACP ran into legal trouble at least
once for supporting litigation when local counsel advanced living expenses to a
plaintiff in a test case.8 9
The legal attacks against the NAACP acquired new venom after the United
States Supreme Court decided Brown v Board of Education in 1954. The state of
Texas sued the NAACP after local counsel sent out letters urging students to
apply to segregated colleges and go to segregated parks in order to create the
facts to file test cases.90 In 1956, Texas succeeded in enjoining the NAACP Le-
gal Defense and Education Fund from soliciting litigation anywhere in the
state.91
During the same period, five other southern states--Georgia, Mississippi,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia--adopted stricter anti-barratry statutes
aimed at curtailing the NAACP's activities within their borders.92 These initia-
tives were part of a broad campaign to cripple the NAACP's post-Brown deseg-
regation efforts. Other legislative avenues included laws requiring political or-
ganizations to register and disclose their membership lists to the state, use of
reporting and disclosure requirements under corporate and tax laws, and out-
right prohibitions against advocating school integration.93
A. DEFENDING AGAINST LEGAL ETHICS ATTACKS
The NAACP and its legal arm, the Legal Defense Fund,94 decided to chal-
lenge the stricter new anti-barratry statutes enacted by a number of southern
states in the wake of Brown by filing declaratory judgment actions against one
such statute in federal district court in Virginia.95 While the old Virginia law had
88. See, for example, Tushnet, Civil Rights Law at 153 (cited in note 3) (counseling branch office that
the national office could not suggest that students initiate lawsuits).
89. Tushnet, CivilRights Law at 272 (cited in note 3).
90. Id at 272-73.
91. Id at 273.
92. Walter F. Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W Pol Q 371, 374
(1959); 2 Race Relations L Rptr 892, 892-94 (1957).
93. See Murphy, 12 W Pol Q at 374-79 (cited in note 92); 2 Race Relations L Rptr at 892-94 (cited
in note 92). Many of these statutes were struck down by federal courts on constitutional grounds. See, for
example, NAACP vAlabama, 357 US 449 (1958) (striking down a statute that required the NAACP to turn
over its membership lists to the state on grounds that this mandate violated members' constitutional right
to "freedom of association").
94. The Legal Defense Fund was formed in 1939 primarily for tax reasons. See Tushnet, Civil R'ghts
Law at 27 (cited in note 3).
95. See NAACP v Paty, 159 F Supp 503 (ED Va 1958). On the state's appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Justice Harlan wrote a majority opinion remanding the case to the district court with instructions to
abstain from construing the contested portions of Virginia's revised statutes until the state courts had been
given the opportunity to interpret them. See Harrison v NAACP, 360 US 167, 178-79 (1959). Button arose
from the NAACP's appeal from the state Supreme Court's unfavorable decision on remand. For greater
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forbidden only the solicitation of legal business by "runners and cappers," 96 the
new statute included a much wider criminal prohibition against such solicitation
by any "agent for an individual or organization which retains a lawyer in connec-
tion with an action to which it is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary
right or liability."'97 Virginia's highest court upheld the constitutionality of this
statute and concluded that certain of the NAACP's litigation activities violated
this law and some ABA canons as well. In particular, the court said that the
NAACP violated Canon 35, which restricted legal representation by lay inter-
mediaries, and Canon 47, which prohibited the "unauthorized practice of law."98
The NAACP appealed the Virginia court's ruling to the United States Su-
preme Court and the Court held oral arguments twice. At the time, no one knew
the reason for this unusual step, but Tushnet's research has revealed that the
Court's decision would have come out the other way had it not been for the
resignations of two justices, Charles Whittaker and Felix Frankfurter, between
the 1961 and 1962 terms.99 The first draft majority opinion, which Frankfurter
wrote in 1961, concluded that "the state did not have to exempt the NAACP
simply because its lawyers were 'moved not by financial gain but by public inter-
est."' ' 0 This would have been the outcome in the case had the two new justices
joining the Court in 1962, Byron White and Arthur Goldberg, not altered the
balance on the Court so that a majority voted in favor of striking down the stat-
ute. 0 1 Luckily for the NAACP, the new majority opinion came out the opposite
way from Frankfurter's, adopting the distinction between conduct engaged in
for nonpecuniary interests versus pecuniary gain that the NAACP had advo-
cated in its brief.
B. NAACP vBUTTON
In considering the issues raised in Button, the Court had little authoritative
legal ethics precedent on which to rely. Indeed, most of the legal ethics law that
did exist pointed in the other direction, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dis-
sent. 02 The only legal ethics rulings the Court could cite in favor of its decision
detail on the procedural history of these cases, see Tushnet, CivilRsghts Law at 274-77 (cited in note 3).
96. A runner "solicits business for attorney from accident victims"; a capper is "a decoy or lure for
purpose of swindling." Black's Law Didionagy 1333,211 (6th ed 1990).
97. Button, 371 US at 423 n 7, citing Va Code §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 (1950), as amended by Acts of
1956, Ex Sess, c 33 (Repl Vol 1958).
98. Harrison, 202 Va at 156-57, 164, 116 SE2d at 67, 72.
99. Tushnet, Civil Rights Law at 279 (cited in note 3).
100. Id at 278, quoting draft opinion Gan 1962), in Frankfurter Papers, Box 164, folder 5 (Harvard
Law School).
101. White agreed with the majority that the state could not constitutionally prohibit "advising the
employment of particular attorneys," but dissented in part because he agreed with some of Harlan's dis-
senting views about the dangers of lay intermediary organizations controlling litigation. See Button, 371 US
at 447 (White concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. See Button, 371 US at 456-60 (Harlan dissenting) (citing legal ethics case law contrary to major-
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were In re Ades, the case Houston and Marshall had litigated so many years be-
fore; a 1935 ABA ethics opinion in which the ABA opined that a lawyer could
properly offer over the radio to represent without compensation individuals
who wished to join a group of manufacturers to challenge the constitutionality
of the National Labor Relations Act;103 and a Georgia case from the 1940s in
which a local bar association was permitted to offer to represent pro bono per-
sons victimized by usurers.1°4
Given this dearth of authoritative legal ethics precedent supporting the
NAACP's position, the Court could not have plausibly based a ruling in the
NAACP's favor solely on legal ethics law. Instead, the Court decided the case as
a matter of first impression under the First Amendment. The Court held that
"the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this record
are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the
legal profession, as improper solicitation of legal business." 105 The Court em-
phasized the political nature of legal representation in giving voice to those dis-
enfranchised by majoritarian political processes. As Justice Brennan wrote for
the majority.
Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the bal-
lot frequently turn to the courts. Just as it was true of the opponents of New Deal
legislation during the 1930s106, for example, no less is it true of the Negro minor-
ity today. And under the conditions of modem government, litigation may well be
the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of griev-
ances.
1
'
The Court further acknowledged that its perspective was strongly influenced
by a rea ohtik sense of the true purposes underlying Virginia's new statute, not-
ing.
We cannot dose our eyes to the fact that the militant Negro civil rights movement
has engendered the intense resentment and opposition of the politically dominant
white community of Virginia; litigation assisted by the NAACP has been bitterly
fought. In such circumstances, a statute broadly curtailing group activity leading to
litigation may easily become a weapon of oppression, however evenhanded its
terms appear. Its mere existence could well freeze out of existence all such activity
ity's holding).
103. See ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op 148 (1935). For a
discussion of the background of this case, see Daniel R. Ernst, Law'ersAgainst Labor. From Individual Rights
to Corporate Liberalism (Illinois 1995). For a discussion of the ABA's prior legal ethics opinions on related
topics, which had taken a different perspective, see Carle, 20 L & Hist Rev at 1 (cited in note 1).
104. See Gunels vAtlantaBarAssn, 191 Ga 366, 12 SE2d 602 (1940).
105. Button, 371 US at 428-29.
106. Here Brennan is referring to ABA Formal Opinion 148, discussed in note 103 above.
107. Button, 371 US at 429-30.
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on behalf of the civil rights of Negro citizens. 108
The Court stated, however, that it did not want to "reach the considerations
of race or racial discrimination which are the predicate of petitioner's challenge
to the statute under the Equal Protection Clause."10 9 It therefore decided to rule
on the alternate First Amendment ground the NAACP had proposed in its
brief. That ground proposed drawing a distinction between litigation for political
aims and litigation for pecuniary motives. Closely tracking the NAACP's brief
and citing Ades, the legal ethics case Charles Houston and Thurgood Marshall
had defended thirty years before, the Court announced that "regulations which
reflect hostility to stirring up litigation have been aimed chiefly at those who
urge recourse to the courts for private gain, serving no public interest." 0 The
Court reasoned that, since NAACP attorneys received very little compensation
for their work, "there is no danger that the attorney will desert or subvert the
paramount interest of his client to enrich himself or an outside sponsor.""'
Thus, the Court concluded, the NAACP's attorneys could not constitutionally
be held to Virginia's anti-barratry laws because the litigation activities in which
they were engaged were being conducted for political, not pecuniary, ends.
In discussing the facts in the case, the Court had accurately described the
nature of the representation arrangements between the local lawyers and the
NAACP's national office, noting that the national office paid modest fees to
these local counsel in order to allow them to keep their legal practices afloat." 2
Despite its awareness that participating lawyers received payment for their legal
work, however, the Court's ruling in Button, especially as interpreted in later
cases, introduced a starker distinction between fee-paid and nonpaid legal work
than the facts of the cases warranted-a distinction which, I have argued else-
where, has tended to warp current conceptions of public interest law." 3
The Court's opinion in Button thus contains two conceptions of public in-
terest lawyering. One conception rests on a "representation reinforcement"
model of public interest lawyering for groups disenfranchised from political
processes, a model similar to Houston's legal realist conception of his work for
the NAACP. The other depends on a bright line distinction between public
interest and private law practice, a model based on the turn-of-the-century mind
set of Storey and other early white NAACP lawyers." 4 That disjunction between
108. Id at 435-36 (Court's footnotes omitted).
109. Id at 444. Tushnet's scrutiny of the Justices' notes from their deliberative conference on Button
leads him to conclude that Brennan added this caveat in response to a charge Harlan intended to include in
his dissent to the effect that the Court was making special rules for the NAACP. See Tushnet, Civil Rigbts
Law at 280 (cited in note 3).
110. Button, 371 US at 440 (Court's footnote omitted).
111. Idat443.
112. Id at 443-44.
113. See Carle, 9 Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L at 93-96 (cited in note 34).
114. See id. See also Carle, 20 L & Hist Rev at 1 (cited in note 1).
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two generations' perspectives on the nature of public interest law practice pre-
sents a continuing source of confusion in Button's analysis, as reflected in the
arguments of Button's "dissenters"-both on and off the Court.
C. BUTTON'S DISSENTERS
As already noted, the majority's holding in Button provoked a strong dissent
by Justice Harlan. Joined by Justices Clark and Stewart, Harlan accused the ma-
jority of ignoring a "formidable history" underlying rules against solicitation and
intervention by lay intermediaries.115 Harlan argued that "although these profes-
sional standards may have been born in a desire to curb malice and self-
aggrandizement by those who would use clients and the courts for their own
pecuniary ends, they have acquired a far broader significance during their long
development."116 After citing ample case law in support of his point, Harlan
concluded:
Underlying this impressive array of relevant precedent is the widely shared convic-
tion that avoidance of improper pecuniary gain is not the only relevant factor in
determining standards of professional conduct. Running perhaps even deeper is
the desire of the profession, of courts, and of legislatures to prevent any interfer-
ence with the uniquely personal relationship between lawyer and client and to
maintain [it] untrammeled by outside influences. 17
Harlan's criticism in Button has been echoed by an unlikely commentator. In
his classic article, Seizing Two Masters, former civil rights litigator Derrick Bell has
forcefully argued that the Court's exemption of public interest lawyers from
certain legal ethics strictures harmed the purported beneficiaries of school de-
segregation litigation.118 In words echoing Harlan's, Bell argued that "the 'di-
vided allegiance' between client and employer which Justice Harlan feared would
interfere with the civil rights lawyer's 'full compliance with his basic professional
obligation' has developed in a far more idealistic and dangerous form," and that
lawyers working for idealistic motives, rather than pecuniary ones, need ethical
policing the most.119 In Bell's words: "Idealism, though perhaps rarer than
115. Button, 371 US at 456-57 (Harlan dissenting).
116. Idat457.
117. Idat460.
118. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Sening Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Cl'ent Interests in School Desegregation
Ltigadon, 85 Yale L J 470, 504-05 (1976). Bell makes a persuasive case that civil rights lawyers took the
wrong track in the post-Brown era in insisting on schools' racial balance over other goals related to improv-
ing African-American children's educational experiences. Bell claims that, if the "real" clients in these
cases--the parents and children in whose names the cases were filed-had decided case strategy, they
would have made very different decisions about remedial priorities than did the NAACP's national office,
which directed a uniform, coordinated litigation plan insisting on full desegregation as the only permissible
remedy.
119. Id at 505, quoting Button, 371 US at 460-62 (Harlan dissenting).
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greed, is harder to control."'120
Bell's article has in turn spawned a thoughtful literature on the ethics of
public interest practice.' 21 That literature has lost sight, however, of Bell's identi-
fication of Button as a juncture at which American conceptions of public interest
law may have gotten on the wrong track. Instead, both that literature and the
United States Supreme Court have continued to adhere to a rigid distinction
between lawyering for "the public interest" and lawyering for private concerns. I
have elsewhere criticized the rigidity of this distinction between "public" and
"private" interest law practice in the post-Button line of cases-a distinction that
underlies much contemporary thinking about public interest law practice, even
though it relies on the same rigid, binary dichotomies that critical scholars have
been debunking in many other fields. 122 I will not belabor this criticism here,
since my purposes here are more descriptive than prescriptive. It is worth not-
ing, however, that none other than Justice Marshall voiced similar concerns in
writing separately in post-Button cases. 123
D. POST-BUTTON CASES
The Button distinction between protected attorney conduct engaged in to
120. Bell, Serving Two Masters at 504 (cited in note 118).
121. Classics in this genre include Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Ations, 34 Stan L Rev
1183 (1982); David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 341-57 (Princeton 1988); Paul R. Tremblay,
Toward a Communit7-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L Rev 1101 (1990); Stephen Ellmann,
Client-Centeredness Muliplied. Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawers' Representa-
tion of Groups, 78 Va L Rev 1103 (1992); Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progres-
sive Law Practice (Westview 1992); William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lauyeing: A Comment on
Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U Miami L Rev 1099 (1994); Richard Delgado,
Rodrgo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 Cal L Rev 61 (1996); William B. Rubenstein,
Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 Yale L
11623 (1997); Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or Monolithic Clients: Positional Conflicts of Interest and the
Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer, 67 Fordham L Rev 2339 (1999). A related literature on the ethics of
individual client representation in the poverty law context has also emphasized the need for "collaborative"
or "client-centered" lawyering that is sensitive to the expressed interests of clients and engages in a process
of dialogue in lieu of lawyer domination. See, for example, Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling:
Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 Ariz L J 501 (1990); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recogni!Zing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 Mich L Rev 485 (1994); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Sunvival Skills, and
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Meaning of Mrs. G., 38 Buff L Rev 1 (1990).
122. See Carle, 9 Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L at 95-96 (cited in note 34). For work criticizing the
public/private distinction in other contexts, see, for example, Adrienne Davis, The Private Law of Race and
Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 Stan L Rev 221, 223-24 (1999) (showing how private law played at least as
significant a role as did public law in defining race and sex relationships in the antebellum period); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 NYU L Rev 543, 544 (2000) (pointing out the pub-
lic/private interdependence in administrative law); Julius German, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious
Polig of Limited Expression, 43 Md L Rev 4 (1984) (criticizing use of the public/private distinction to curtail
free speech rights in the labor context); Frances Olson, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 10 Const Comm 319 (1993) (presenting a basic feminist critique of the public/private
distinction). See also, Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U Pa L Rev 1289 (1982).
123. Thanks to Judith Maute for reminding me of this connection.
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further political interests worthy of First Amendment protection and unpro-
tected conduct of the same type engaged in for pecuniary aims continues to
drive the Supreme Court's legal ethics jurisprudence. In 1978, the Court rein-
forced the Button distinction in two companion cases decided on the same day.
In Ohralik v Ohio State BarAssodaion,124 the Court upheld the state bar's prosecu-
tion of a personal injury lawyer for having engaged in unseemly behavior in ag-
gressively soliciting two teenage clients involved in a car accident in violation of
state bar rules prohibiting lawyers from soliciting clients. In In re Piimus,125 the
Court invalidated South Carolina's prosecution, under disciplinary rules almost
identical to those of Ohio, of an ACLU lawyer who had offered her services for
free to a woman who had undergone involuntary sterilization. Distinguishing
Ohralik, the Court in Pimus explained, "This was not in-person solicitation for
pecuniary gain. Appellant was communicating an offer of free assistance ...
[a]nd her actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to
advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial
gain." 126 The Court's analysis further relied on the parallels between the objec-
tives, methods, and organizational structure of the ACLU and the NAACP,
noting, for example, that in both cases the lawyers at issue were not expecting to
obtain any personal financial reward from having taken the cases, but were in-
stead "organized as a staff and paid" by the organization.127
Most recently, the Court continued to adhere to this rationale in Florida Bar
v Went For It, Inc,128 in which it rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of
state bar rules that prohibited lawyers from soliciting personal injury clients by
mail within thirty days of an accident. Applying the standards applicable under
its commercial speech doctrines, which accord lower levels of constitutional
scrutiny to restrictions on commercial, as opposed to political, speech, the Court
upheld the state bar rules on the ground that the harms the rules sought to pre-
vent outweighed the infringement on attorneys' First Amendment rights.
In short, under the line of cases originating in Button, state bar rules against
client solicitation cannot constitutionally be applied against lawyers organized
into nonprofit "public interest" organizations pursuing social or political objec-
tives, but continue to be enforceable against individual lawyers who represent
clients--even, presumably, the same clients in the same cases-under contin-
gency fee or fee for service arrangements.
It surely is no coincidence that former NAACP advocate Thurgood Mar-
shall, writing as a concurring Justice in In iv Puimus and Ohralik, took issue with
the Court's application of NAACP v Button. Reviving the history underlying
Button, including its reliance on In re Ades, Marshall argued that the conduct that
124. 436 US 447,468 (1978).
125. 436 US 412 (1978).
126. Id at 422.
127. Id at 429, quoting Button, 371 US at 434 (Harlan dissenting).
128. 515 US 618, 635 (1995).
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should be prohibited in Ohra/ik and like cases is not solicitation per se but the
abusive and unprofessional form that solicitation took in Obra#k.2 9 Marshall
cautioned against the Court's use of a restrictive test for permissible solicitation,
noting that "rules against solicitation substantially impede the flow of important
information to consumers" and that "[t]he provision of such information about
legal rights and remedies is an important function, even where the rights and
remedies are of a private and commercial nature involving no constitutional or
political overtones."1 30 Marshall further criticized the Court's application of the
commercial speech doctrine in Obralik, arguing that "[t]he First Amendment
informational interests served by solicitation, whether or not it occurs in a
purely commercial context, are substantial.' 1 31
Even more tellingly, Marshall criticized the outdated model of lawyering
underlying the Court's approach in the Button line of cases. Marshall argued that
this model rested on "rules of 'etiquette"' based on "the notion that a lawyer's
reputation in his community would spread by word of mouth," which was in
turn based on images "of the small, cohesive, and homogenous community."132
These images, Marshall noted, were "anachronistic" and "valid only with respect
to those persons who move in ... relatively elite social and educational cir-
cles." 133 Thus, Marshall concluded, "Just as the persons who suffer most from
lack of knowledge about lawyers' availability belong to the less privileged classes
of society, so the Disciplinary Rules against solicitation fall most heavily on
those attorneys engaged in a single-practitioner or small-partnership form of
practice."134
It is surely an ironic twist that it is one of the NAACP's chief advocates,
having assumed a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court, who must write to remind
the Court-and us today-of the original permeability of the line between
"public interest" lawyering and the kind of small firm, fee-for-service practice
arrangements that characterized the local counsel involved in the NAACP's
public impact litigation campaigns. My research into the history underlying But-
ton's conception of the relationship between legal ethics law and public interest
law practice suggests questions similar to those Marshall raised, especially with
respect to the possible class and race implications of excluding all forms of fee-
for-service representation from the definition of public interest law. This sym-
posium and paper, focusing on the history of legal ethics law, are not the places
to undertake a full examination of these issues as they concern us today, but
some of the questions one might ask include: Does the Button exclusion of all
fee-for-service arrangements from the definition of public interest practice cre-
129. See Obralik, 436 US at 470 (Marshall concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
130. Id at 473.
131. Id at 474.
132. Id at 474-75.
133. Idat475.
134. Id (citations and footnotes omitted).
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ate a system dominated by those whose elite education, class, and other re-
sources provide a safety net making employment at minimal compensation in
nonprofit organizations feasible? Put otherwise, does the rigid distinction Button
draws between public and private interest promote the practice of public interest
law by the Moorfield Storeys of our profession, but not by local grassroots law-
yers struggling to make ends meet in the mold of Scipio Jones? Finally, if client
exploitation is the core concern underlying the Button line of Supreme Court
cases, why not focus on that issue directly rather than carve a distinction based
on pecuniary versus nonpecuniary intent, yet another variant on the pub-
lic/private distinction that has proved so unsatisfactory in other areas?135 All of
these are provocative, difficult questions raised by an examination of the ways in
which legacies of class and professional power are embedded in our contempo-
rary legal ethics norms-including our conceptions of public interest law prac-
tice.
IV. CONCLUSION: FROM B UCHANAN TO BUTTON
In this article I have contrasted the professional identities, experiences, and
jurisprudential commitments of two chief NAACP legal advocates of different
generations and linked these factors to these lawyers' correspondingly different
approaches to the organization's legal ethics challenges. I have explored how a
complex interplay of variables, including race and, relatedly, insider versus out-
sider status within the legal profession; political and social context, including
especially the southern backlash against the NAACP; and jurisprudential com-
mitments, especially the move from notions of natural law to sociological juris-
prudence, all played a part in the transition from Buchanan to Button. Finally, I
have suggested that these factors in turn played a part in changing conceptions
of public interest law and, relatedly, in changing conceptions of the ethical
norms that govern public interest law practice.
In an era that viewed "the public interest" as unitary and nonproblematic,
Supreme Court advocates such as Moorfield Storey--and the Justices them-
selves--displayed seemingly little sensitivity to the potentially problematic na-
ture of test case litigation strategies, at least in cases handled by members of the
bar's governing elite. But in an era characterized by greater awareness of the
problems of defining the public interest in a pluralistic society, the NAACP's
legal advocates and the United States Supreme Court were required to confront
and struggle head on with the tensions between traditional legal ethics strictures
and the NAACP's public impact litigation campaigns. That process produced
new legal ethics doctrines embodying conceptions of public interest law that
display a curious mix of early and later twentieth-century thinking.
135. See the literature cited in note 122.

